Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research into Law by Klink, B.J.M. (Bart) van & Taekema, H.S. (Sanne)
Bart van Klink / Sanne Taekema, Tilburg / Rotterdam 
 
Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research into Law. A Comparison of 
Pragmatist and Positivist Views 
 
 
1. FACTS AND VALUES 
 
To a growing extent, legal scholars seem to be dissatisfied with established 
disciplinary boundaries and turn to other disciplines, such as sociology (Cotterrell 
2006), psychology (Wagenaar, Van Koppen & Crombag 1993), philosophy (Alexy 
2003), economics (Posner 2007) and even literature studies (White 1985), for 
inspiration. In law faculties all over the world multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
research groups are operative, such as the Jurisprudence and Social Policy program at 
the University of California, Berkeley, or the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge 
University. In the hope of increasing their chances to acquire a grant, applicants 
nowadays try to cut a dash with promises of combining insights from many different 
sources (Vick 2004, 171). One may wonder who will undertake the important but 
time-consuming task of analysing and classifying the existing body of legal norms in 
the future, when legal scholars are getting more and more reluctant to do so. However 
exciting these new research directions may appear, a fundamental question which 
deserves more attention is: What are the limits and possibilities of interdisciplinary 
research into law? Can concepts and methods from one discipline directly be 
transplanted into another discipline? What is lost and what is gained when insights 
from different origins are combined?  
In this article, we want to explore what might make interdisciplinary research 
possible, on the one hand, and what makes it difficult or even impossible, on the other 
hand. Rather than pursuing these questions in the abstract, we investigate two 
theoretical positions that seem to offer radically different approaches to this question: 
pragmatism versus legal positivism. We have selected these approaches because they 
differ in particular on the issue whether facts and values can be separated or not, 
which seem to determine to a large extent – together with some other factors which 
will be mentioned below – their view on the limits and possibilities of 
interdisciplinary legal research. First, we will discuss the pragmatist theory, especially 
of John Dewey, which offers an optimistic view of combining different scientific 
disciplines (section 2). Rejecting a strict fact-value distinction, Dewey sees plenty of 
opportunities to combine insights from empirical and normative approaches. 
Secondly, we will discuss two positivist positions which both posit serious limitations 
on interdisciplinary legal research: to begin with, Kelsen‟s pure theory of law and, 
subsequently, Luhmann‟s system theory (section 3). Especially Hans Kelsen is sceptic 
about interdisciplinary legal research, because in his view no meaningful exchanges 
can be established between different types of disciplines. Whereas the sociology of 
law, in Kelsen‟s view, deals with law solely as an empirical phenomenon, that is as 
power, the science of law approaches law from a normative point of view as a body of 
norms that ought to be obeyed. Niklas Luhmann, in his earlier work particularly, takes 
a more moderate position. Finally, some of the major limits and possibilities of 
different types of legal research – ranging from strictly monodisciplinary to highly 
integrated interdisciplinary research – are discussed in the light of the foregoing 
discussion between pragmatism and positivism (section 4).  
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2. POSSIBILITIES OF INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH ACCORDING 
TO PRAGMATISM 
 
Pragmatist philosophy is a good starting point for exploring the possibilities of 
interdisciplinary research for at least two reasons. First, pragmatism is generally 
suspicious of dichotomies, which also applies to the boundaries between disciplines. 
Second, pragmatism proposes a general scientific method which is meant to apply to 
all knowledge. 
 The classical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey is a theory that 
addresses questions of scientific truth and inquiry in the context of problem-solving in 
everyday experience (James 1975, 34–35; Dewey 1984, 178).1 It sees science as a 
mundane practice that is continuous with other activities people engage in. This view 
of science, to which we will return shortly, comes with a specific view of (scientific) 
reasoning in which strict separations or dichotomies are rejected: distinctions should 
only be made insofar as they are useful. Especially in Dewey‟s theory, the rejection of 
dichotomies is a central theme which is supported by a holistic view of the world as 
we experience it. Although it makes sense to distinguish categories such as for 
instance „thinking‟ and „doing‟ from each other, we should beware of turning such 
categories into separate entities: in reality they are connected in many ways and the 
categories are only relevant because and when they help us to reason more clearly. In 
the context of this paper, the most important separations to be rejected according to 
pragmatism are the separation between different types of science and the separation 
between fact and value. 
 In Dewey‟s work the continuity between inquiry in the natural sciences and 
inquiry in social and moral subjects is a major theme (1984, 201; 1988, 178). His 
belief that both physical science and moral „science‟ would benefit immensely from 
the realization that knowledge of physical goods and knowledge of moral goods are 
interrelated, is his main drive for developing a theory of experimental inquiry in the 
normative realm. His theory can be described as an extension, a broadening, of the 
method of physical inquiry into a much wider field. This is true of law as well: what 
Dewey also calls „logical method” is equally applicable to mathematics, law, or even 
farming. Although Dewey acknowledges that there is a difference between science 
and practical reasoning in that scientific disciplines work in a narrowly delineated 
field and with specific methods and concepts, he believes that the same method can be 
applied in legal reasoning and judicial decision-making. He does not explicitly 
consider the differences between legal scholarship and the practice of law, but it is in 
the line of pragmatist thinking to see scholarship and practice on a continuum. 
 The pragmatist rejection of the fact-value separation is most forcefully 
defended by Hilary Putnam. In his formulation, the general claim is that knowledge of 
facts presumes knowledge of values and, vice versa, knowledge of values presumes 
knowledge of facts (1995, 14). Putnam‟s argument takes the form of a criticism of a 
non-cognitivist theory of ethics. According to non-cognitivists, we cannot know 
anything about values; values are a matter of commendation or preference which 
cannot be debated. According to Putnam, non-cognitivists are mistaken in their claim 
that evaluation of behaviour as good or bad can be separated from factual judgments. 
There is no neat division between the factual characterization of behaviour ─ „what 
you just did was rude‟─ and evaluation of that behaviour ─ „being rude is bad‟ 
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 We will focus mainly on Dewey‟s theory because he has addressed the question of scientific 
disciplines more directly. In addition, we will present Putnam as a contemporary exponent of 
pragmatist thought.
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(Putnam 2002, 36). Factual and value judgments go together, which can be most 
clearly shown by looking at criticism of a judgment. The typical way someone denies 
that his behaviour was rude, for example, is by appealing to facts which change the 
judgment of the situation: „My behaviour may have seemed rude, but I could not stop 
and talk to you because I was late for a meeting.” 
 This thesis is based on the holistic ontology of classical pragmatism: the idea 
that we find ourselves in the middle of our own experience, in the middle of a world 
in which fact and value, natural and social factors, humans and other beings, are not 
distinct nor neatly categorized (Dewey 1989, 352). If this experience of the world is 
taken as the starting point for ontology, the world appears as a whole: distinctions are 
made for special purposes but do not reflect ontological truths. Although we can in 
principle distinguish factual judgments from evaluative judgments, many of those 
judgments are mixed and there is not a clear separating line between the two 
categories. The examples Putnam uses to illustrate this point are so-called „thick‟ 
moral concepts, such as cruelty or bravery, which are concepts giving a factual and an 
evaluative judgment at the same time (Putnam 2002, 38–39). To say that someone is 
cruel combines factual and evaluative elements in a such a way they are 
interdependent, or in Putnam‟s terms, „entangled” (2002, 43). 
 The main underlying reason for making a sharp separation between facts and 
values is the common belief that values are merely subjective or emotive, and that 
therefore no true knowledge of values is possible. In the pragmatist view, this belief is 
false: there is no more a sharp separation between the subjective and the objective 
than there is between fact and value (or practice and theory for that matter). Although 
value judgments involve subjective appreciation by the individual, they are not merely 
that, and they may be subject to well-founded criticism. Such criticism is not simply 
another value judgment; most often, facts are invoked to underpin that criticism. 
Similarly, factual judgments can be accepted for reasons that are not factual 
themselves. This is most clear in the case of science: whether a fact is accepted as true 
is in part a matter of coherence and plausibility in the light of a theory and the clarity 
and simplicity of the explanation. These are all matters of evaluation. 
 The rejection of both separations, the one between scientific disciplines and 
the one between fact and value, is closely connected to the pragmatist view of 
scientific method. For pragmatists, the core of the scientific method is experimental: 
by testing hypotheses in experiments, a scientist can determine whether the 
hypotheses work and therefore hold them to be true. Scientific inquiry is thus 
regarded as an active process in which proposed solutions to problems are tested; it is 
also open-ended, because the truth of propositions is provisional and can be refuted by 
later experiences. Dewey proposes to apply the scientific model of inquiry to all 
problems, including moral problems (1988, 173). This implies that legal reasoning 
should also follow the scientific method: a case is a problem for which hypothetical 
solutions should be formulated and then tested by tracing their foreseeable 
consequences (Dewey 1998, 361). 
 The same holds for legal scholarship generally, extending beyond particular 
practical legal problems. Wherever a problem is perceived, whether practical or 
theoretical, that problem should be approached by inquiring into its conditions, i.e. 
how did it come about, and by considering the consequences of possible solutions. 
One of the questions that arise is to what extent legal solutions can be tested 
experimentally: does legal scholarship allow for testing in the same way as the natural 
sciences? Of course, there are limits to what we can test. Social and legal situations 
cannot be manipulated by a researcher as fully as natural ones can in a laboratory 
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situation. However, there are other ways: small-scale social experiments are possible 
(as Dewey proved with his Chicago laboratory school in which he tried his 
pedagogical ideas), and more importantly, researchers can also go through this 
process imaginatively. By systematically thinking through the consequences of a 
solution, an experiment can be imitated in imagination. So, although there are small 
differences between natural and human sciences, they are nevertheless seen as capable 
of being investigated along the same lines. 
 In general, therefore, it seems we may conclude that pragmatist theory does 
not see the difference between disciplines as profound and sees interdisciplinary 
research as a perfectly normal way of approaching inquiry (without calling it 
„interdisciplinary‟, a phrase which already draws attention to the difference between 
disciplines). This is slightly too quick, however. Although the experimental method of 
inquiry is to be applied generally, its starting point in problem-solving has a 
particularistic side to it as well. Dewey stresses that every problem has its own 
specific context, but that the relevance of this context is not clear automatically: it is a 
matter of selective interest (Dewey 1960, 101). Every researcher, consciously but 
more often unconsciously, makes choices by selecting some contextual elements as 
relevant and by ignoring others. This need for selection brings in the background of 
the researcher, including his disciplinary background, as an important determinant of 
what is seen as relevant and interesting. A person‟s disciplinary perspective is for 
numerous reasons, such as the theoretical and cultural traditions on which it draws 
(Dewey 1960, 99–100), the main lens through which a problem is analysed. 
 This attention to context and the selective interest of a researcher in connection 
to his disciplinary perspective are starting points for an argument that pragmatist 
theory can make room for disciplines as a relevant category. On the general level of 
pragmatist philosophy, there is therefore no principled judgment for or against 
recognizing disciplines. On the one hand, they are a key factor in determining the 
perspective of a researcher; on the other hand, within all disciplines the general 
method of scientific inquiry is advocated. This means that pragmatism sees no real 
obstacles to practicing interdisciplinary research: although the traditions of a scientific 
discipline provide a specific focus and approach, researchers can overcome the 
boundaries of their discipline with a creative and critical attitude.
2
 The differences 
between disciplines account for the different starting points of researchers, but as long 
as they are willing to apply the pragmatic method, they can distinguish between the 
relevant and the irrelevant aspects of the context of their inquiry and can combine the 
insights from different disciplines. Applying this to law, Dewey puts forward the idea 
that „law is through and through a social phenomenon; social in origin, in purpose or 
end, and in application” (1941, 76). Law should therefore been studied as a social 
activity in relation to other social activities. 
 We may conclude that pragmatism sees interdisciplinary research as desirable 
and is optimistic about the possibilities of doing research that crosses traditional 
boundaries. There are, however, a number of critical remarks that can be put to 
pragmatist theory, two of which we will mention briefly.
3
 First, there is the matter of 
the general application of one, logical, method of inquiry to all fields of scholarship. 
Deweyan pragmatism assumes that all disciplines should work with a 
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 On the importance of the individual as a critical and creative interpreter of (legal) traditions in 
pragmatist theory, see Taekema (2006, 220 ff). 
3
 An extended criticism of Dewey‟s position can be found in our paper „A Dynamic Model of 
Interdisciplinarity. Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research into Law‟, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1142847 (last checked on 1 August 2008). 
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consequentialist, problem-oriented method. However, this method of inquiry is not 
necessarily the right method for legal scholarship in all its forms. From Dewey‟s 
perspective, seeing law as primarily a social phenomenon, it makes perfect sense, but 
there are other views of law which are equally legitimate that call for different 
methods. If we look at law as a field that is based on texts and arguments revolving 
around those texts, law has more in common with the methods of the humanities. 
Textual analysis, interpretation and argumentation instead of experimental testing of 
hypotheses are then the central methodology. Secondly, established practices of 
interdisciplinary research show that it is not so easy to be critical of your own 
perspective and to step outside the discourse of your discipline. In our view, the 
specific language and presuppositions of a discipline exert a larger influence than 
someone like Dewey acknowledges. As a researcher, you are educated and socialized 
in a particular practice, consciously and unconsciously internalizing its norms. 
Awareness of disciplinary differences does not automatically mean that you can also 
overcome those differences. Truly appreciating the work done in another discipline 
might require unlearning your own disciplinary perspective.   
These are some critical remarks specifically addressed to pragmatism. For a 
more general critical view of interdisciplinary research, we now turn to positivism. 
 
3. Limits of Interdisciplinary Research According to Positivism 
 
Whereas pragmatism highlights the possibilities of interdisciplinary research, 
positivist theories point to its limitations or even to its sheer impossibility. We will 
start with Kelsen‟s pure theory of law, because it offers one of the most radical and 
principled defences of a monodisciplinary approach to law, and turn later to 
Luhmann‟s system theory that may provide a middle ground between the two 
extremes. Inspired by neo-Kantianism,
4
 Hans Kelsen intends to construct a solid 
scientific foundation for the science of law in order to secure its position among other 
sciences, in particular the natural sciences. For that purpose, the question has to be 
answered what is typical or unique about the way the science of law understands its 
object and how it differs from other understandings. In his discussion with Eugen 
Ehrlich,
5
 Kelsen (2003) argues that the phenomenon of law can be studied from two 
different perspectives. On the one hand, the law can be conceived of as a norm, that 
is, a rule that articulates a specific kind of „ought‟ (Sollen): something has to be done 
or not be done. On the other hand, the law may be taken as a part of social reality, as a 
fact or an occurrence that takes place regularly. Here, the law takes the form of an „is‟ 
(Sein) proposition with respect to human behaviour: some action is done or not done 
on a regular basis. These two perspectives correspond with two different disciplines 
from which law can be studied: respectively, a normative science of law that 
determines deductively which rules are valid (gelten), and an explanatory sociology 
of law that establish inductively a certain regularity for which it tries to find a causal 
explanation. Thus, the science of law is a normative and deductive science of value, 
like ethics and logics, whereas the sociology of law, like other branches of sociology, 
is a science of reality, and conforms more generally to the methodological practices of 
the natural sciences. It is equally possible and legitimate to study law from both 
perspectives, but not at the same time. An object cannot be construed as something 
                                                   
4
 On the relationship between Kelsen‟s pure theory of Law and neo-Kantianism, see Dreier (1990, 56-
90) and Pascher (1997, 151-173).  
5
 Previously Van Klink has written a paper on the Ehrlich-Kelsen debate, which is available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=980957 (last checked on 1 August 2008). 
 6 
that is done or happens regularly and that ought to be done or happen simultaneously. 
Biology, as an explanatory science, may establish a causal link between two factual 
occurrences (e.g., between firing a gun and somebody‟s death), but is not capable of 
evaluating this link in terms of good/bad or legal/illegal. Conversely, ethics and the 
science of law, as normative sciences, may dismiss a certain action (e.g., killing 
someone by firing a gun) as bad, if it violates an ethical norm, or illegal, if it violates 
a legal norm; however, they are not able to explain this action.  
According to Kelsen (2003, 5), combining perspectives from different 
disciplines would lead to a „methodological syncretism” and is, therefore, 
„inadmissable”.6 Moreover, if a certain phenomenon is approached from different 
disciplines it cannot, in his view, constitute one and the same object of knowledge 
(Kelsen 1962, 106–110). Because object and method of inquiry are correlated, 
different methods of inquiry necessarily generate different objects. Law can be 
studied either from a normative (e.g., legal) perspective or from an empirical (e.g., 
sociological) perspective, but these perspectives cannot be integrated into one single 
conception of the object at hand. Otherwise, the unity of knowledge is threatened: it 
becomes possible to make contradictory claims about the same object. For instance, a 
legal norm may be considered valid from a legal perspective, because its creation is 
authorized by a higher legal norm, as well as not valid from a sociological point of 
view, since it might not have any effect on real life (people do not actually comply 
with the norm). Law cannot be valid and not-valid at the same time, so apparently we 
are dealing with different senses of validity.  
 A less radical position is taken by Niklas Luhmann in Ausdifferenzierung des 
Rechts (1981). In this earlier work, he rejects the is/ought dichotomy on which 
Kelsen‟s pure theory of law is based. „Such a separation is impracticable for a 
sociology that has human action as its topic” (Luhmann 1981, 288–289). According to 
Luhmann (1981, 191), ever since the downfall of the natural-law doctrine, legal 
science has existed in „interdisciplinary isolation”, separated from the social sciences. 
In his system theory he aims at re-establishing the connection between legal science 
and other disciplines. In his view, legal science should develop a „steering system that 
goes beyond legal dogmatics” (überdogmatisches Steuerungssystem) by which means 
it can secure its capability for interdisciplinary contacts (Luhmann 1981, 192). This 
„steering system” is provided by a general jurisprudence or legal theory that, in a 
short formula, reduces decision problems to system problems. The legal system is 
centred around decision: the legislature has to decide which general legal norms have 
to be issued, whereas the court has to decide on the right application of these legal 
norms in concrete cases. The science of law reflects on a more abstract and systematic 
level on the decisions made by legal authorities and unites them in a coherent system 
of legal norms. Therefore, Luhmann (1981, 283) characterizes the science of law as a 
„science of decision” (entscheidungstheoretische Wissenschaft). In relation to the 
juristic science of decision, legal theory plays an auxiliary role: by means of 
functional analysis, it identifies and clarifies existing problems in the various 
subsystems of society and gives suggestions how these problems can be solved with 
legal or other instruments. In this way, legal theory acts as a kind of portal through 
which insights from other disciplines are channelled to the science of law; it 
establishes „meaningful relations” that enable the „transfer of problem awareness, 
concepts and knowledge achievements” (Luhmann 1981, 193).  
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 Consequently, in Luhmann‟s view, no fundamental distinction can be made 
between normative sciences, such as the science of law, on the one hand and 
empirical, reality-oriented sciences, such as sociology, on the other. Despite 
differences in methods and theoretical presumptions, legal science and sociology co-
operate in the process of understanding and reducing complexity. This complexity 
results from the experience of contingency: in the modern era, reality is generally 
understood, not as a pre-given and fixed entity, but as something constantly changing 
and changeable. To make meaningful interaction possible in the face of contingency, 
expectations regarding experience and actions have to be generalized. This can be 
done, among other things, by means of norms. „Norms are a form of generalization 
under which the real can be perceived and endured as contingent” (Luhmann 1981, 
213). Norms contribute to stabilizing expectations in social interactions. According to 
Luhmann, these expectations have a legal character only if they are generalized in 
temporal, objective and social terms. In a system governed by the rule of law, it is the 
primary task of the legislature to determine the content of the law and, thus, to reduce 
complexity. Generally speaking, the court has to take the legal norms promulgated by 
the legislature for granted and has to apply them to individual cases.
7
 
In Luhmann‟s view, sociology may assist the legislature8 in the process of 
norm creation and complexity reduction by providing a functional analysis of system 
problems. Because it is not restricted to the norms already issued, sociology has more 
freedom to explore alternatives within or outside the existing legal system. The 
functional method is a heuristic device or a method of clarification that does not result 
in a decision but may facilitate the decision process. As Luhmann (1981, 302–304) 
for instance shows, it follows from a functional analysis that financial compensation 
for erroneous administrative decisions can only be granted if there are no legal means 
for those concerned to prevent the damage. Without engaging itself in moral value 
judgments, sociology traces functional deficiencies in existing social systems and 
suggests possible solutions to overcome them. Whether this suggestion is turned into 
positive law, is up to the legislature to decide.  
Given the complexity of today‟s world and the demand for information, 
sociology is a „necessary preparatory science for the science of law” that paves the 
way for juristic decisions (Luhmann 1981, 294–295). Although both disciplines are 
connected, they do not coincide. According to Luhmann (1981, 306), a clear 
distinction between system theories and decision theories still appears to be 
„unavoidable”. System theories offer a functional analysis of problem constellations 
within systems, whereas juristic decision theories design and deploy hermeneutic-
exegetical methods for the creation and application of legal norms. The relationship 
between both disciplines can best be described in terms of „separation and co-
operation”: functional analysis results in identifying problems that provide the input 
for „juristic decision programmes” which, subsequently, „concretizes” them in 
rightful decisions (Luhmann 1981, 307). As said earlier, legal theory is the locus in 
which these interdisciplinary contacts are established. By implication, it becomes a 
branch of general sociology. 
 Luhmann‟s system theory seems to offer an attractive middle position between 
two extremes: Dewey‟s integrative vision in which disciplines are mixed and mixed 
up in one unified whole on the one hand and Kelsen‟s rigorous separation of 
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disciplines on the other. Against Dewey, Luhmann argues that there are limits to 
interdisciplinary research: every discipline has it own methods and theoretical 
presumptions, without which it would not be able to investigate anything. Therefore, a 
full integration of disciplines is never possible. Against Kelsen, he brings forward that 
meaningful connections between scientific disciplines are possible if one is willing to 
give up the categorical is/ought or fact/norm distinction. The key notion here is 
„meaning‟ (Sinn; Luhmann 1981, 292) that functions as a hinge, both connecting and 
separating disciplines: system theories as well as decision theories seek to find a 
specific access to the world in order to understand and to come to grips with its 
complexity and contingency, but each has its own way of doing to so, by functional 
analysis of problem complexes within social systems and by hermeneutic exegesis of 
previous understandings in authoritative texts respectively.  
 By presenting his sociological findings as likely candidates for adoption by the 
existing legal system and by prioritizing them over other candidates from other 
normative (religious, moral, or other) sources, Luhmann deliberately transgresses the 
boundaries of an empirical sociology and enters the realm of politics. His attempt to 
de-moralize sociology in fact constitutes a re-moralization of the discipline. The 
good/bad opposition of traditional morality is replaced by the only seemingly neutral, 
technological dichotomy between functional/non-functional. From a Kelsenian 
perspective, this position raises several questions. Firstly, how can normative claims 
be founded by means of sociology? How does one assess the functionality of social 
systems? Secondly, how can sociological findings be translated into normative-legal 
claims? In short: why should the law bother about a system‟s functionality? Thirdly, 
why are normative claims based on sociological research superior to claims from 
other normative sources? Why should functional considerations have to trump 
arguments based on, e.g., religion, morality or law?
9
  
 One way to save Luhmann‟s project and, at the same time, the potential for 
crossdisciplinary research it contains, is (i) to reject his reduction of legal theory to 
sociology and (ii) to recognize the autonomy legal science and legal practice have in 
addressing conflicting normative claims. That means that legal theory should offer a 
platform, without conflating disciplinary boundaries Dewey-wise, to many different 
disciplines that provide different descriptions and evaluations of law and legal 
practice, such as psychology, political philosophy, economics, rhetoric and ethics. 
Sociology has no monopoly on the production of both facts and norms. Moreover, it 
should be acknowledged that legal science and legal practice assess these concurring 
descriptions and evaluations according to their own, intersystemic standards, such as 
legal security and legality. As Luhmann (1981, 323) argues, „only insertable norms 
can become law”. However, that limits the possibility of transplanting sociological 
findings into the law to a far greater extent than he seems willing to accept when he 
presents sociology as the preparatory science for the science of law. From a legal 
perspective, all non-legal norms are on an equal footing in their struggle for official 
recognition by legal authorities. 
In his later work, in particular in Recht der Gesellschaft (1995), Luhmann 
abandons the privileged status he granted earlier to the sociology of law in the 
production of legal norms all together. Generally speaking, he develops a far more 
detached and sceptic view on the possibilities of interaction between the legal system 
and its environment [Umwelt]. He acknowledges that „structural couplings” between 
systems may occur, when „a system presupposes characteristics of its surroundings 
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for a longer time and relies on them structurally” (Luhmann 1995, 441). However, 
structural couplings can only cause „irritations, surprises, disturbances” within a 
system (442). How a system deals with „irritations” caused by structural couplings, is 
determined by its own structures and the operations that are part of these structures. 
As a consequence, norms from outside the legal system (such as efficiency norms 
derived from the economic system) can never be transplanted into the existing body 
of legal norms directly. Like any other system, a legal system can only be „irritated in 
its own values” (494). Norms – or any other input – from outside have a chance to 
enter the legal system, only if they can be connected to norms that are already 
included in that system; that is, if these „foreign‟ norms are somehow familiar. 
Therefore, the possibilities of interdisciplinary exchange of ideas will be, by 
necessity, limited.  
In his classification of scientific approaches to law, Luhmann reiterates the 
fact/norm opposition that he rejected earlier. He distinguishes between „self-
descriptions” of the legal system on the one hand and „foreign descriptions” on the 
other (497). Self-descriptions of the legal system offered by the science of law and by 
legal theory have to understand law – predominantly or entirely – as a normative 
phenomenon: „it is not acceptable for the system to conceive of norms as something 
purely factual (like factual behavioural expectations)” (502). On the other hand, 
Luhmann states: „The external description can afford to restrict itself to the 
observation: that is the way it is” [so ist es] (529). Thus, the sociology of law and the 
science of law seem to inhibit different intellectual worlds: the ought-world versus the 
is-world respectively. By reinstating the fact/norm distinction, Luhmann is able to 
avoid most of the methodological questions that his earlier position encountered from 
a Kelsenian perspective. However, his detached view on interdisciplinary research 
makes it difficult to see how a meaningful exchange of concepts and methods 
between different scientific disciplines can ever take place. He does not deny that 
external and internal descriptions can influence each other: „The structure of social 
differentiation . . . enables external descriptions to influence internal ones, and vice 
versa, because overarching communication remains possible as execution of society 
[Vollzug der Gesellschaft], even if boundaries between systems are drawn within 
society” (497). Though Luhmann in his later work10 does not exclude the possibility 
of interdisciplinary research altogether, he mainly focuses on the problems of 
meaningful interactions between different systems caused by their relative closedness. 
The question remains under what conditions interdisciplinary research may be 
desirable or even unavoidable and how to deal with the methodological challenges it 
offers.  
 
 
4. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY  
 
Between the two extremes of Kelsen and Dewey, there is quite a broad range of 
middle ground. Luhmann (the earlier more than the later) is one of the theorists 
occupying this middle ground, but to his position a number of more and less extreme 
views may be added. On the basis of our assessment of Dewey, Kelsen and Luhmann 
we see a number of legitimate possibilities for viewing interdisciplinary research. The 
most important conclusion to draw from the different theories of these authors is that 
one‟s view of interdisciplinarity is determined first and foremost by one‟s general 
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view of science. With an emphasis on scientific clarity and rigour, like Kelsen, 
disciplinary boundaries have a value in their own right, which is threatened by 
interdisciplinary research. With an emphasis on continuity between concepts and 
problem-solving, like Dewey, disciplinary boundaries have value only insofar as they 
are useful in generating solutions. Therefore, fundamental choices and beliefs 
regarding concept-formation, the nature of truth, the status of distinctions, especially 
the fact-value distinction, and the tasks of scientific research, determine the place that 
interdisciplinarity can have. In our view, taking a particular approach to the nature of 
science is inevitable, a choice which entails the extent of interdisciplinary work that 
fits that particular perspective on scientific research.  
Depending on the type of questions one wants to answer and one‟s own 
interests and capacities, one can decide either to stick to traditional monodisciplinary 
research, possibly with heuristical or more substantial input from another discipline, 
or to adopt a multidisciplinary or an interdisciplinary approach. However, every 
approach has its possibitities and limitations. In our concluding remarks, we will 
discuss briefly the main advantages of different kinds of research and the most 
important challenges or risks each of them faces. Our dynamic model of 
interdisciplinarity
11
 consists of five different types of research: (i) traditional legal 
research, (ii) legal research that uses insights from other disciplines heuristically as a 
source of inspiration, (iii) legal research that uses other disciplines as supporting 
disciplines, (iv) multidisciplinary research into law in which two disciplines are on an 
equal footing and (v) interdisciplinary research into law that aims at an integration of 
disciplines.
 
 
 (i) To begin with, monodisciplinary research into law consists in the 
collection, analysis and systematization of legal norms that are promulgated by the 
legislature and applied by the courts, in many cases together with an assessment 
thereof on the basis of legal or other (e.g., political, ethical, or sociological) standards. 
Traditionally, it has always been the task of the science of law to describe the content 
of the law in the past as well as in the present. Since the law changes continuously, 
there will always be enough work for this kind of monodisciplinary research. 
Different actors in society can profit from the knowledge accumulated by the science 
of law: from politicians who want to contest the legality of some draft or bill in 
Parliament to citizens who aim at getting their right before the court. According to 
Kelsen and other legal positivists, legal science should limit itself to a representation 
of the legal system as it is and to an assessment of its logical consistency, because 
otherwise it would loose its distinctive character and thereby its scientific raison 
d’être. In Kelsen‟s view, normative questions about what the law ought to be cannot 
be answered scientifically, but belong to the political sphere. However, legal scholars 
who are working within a natural law or interactionist framework reject a strict 
is/ought distinction and, therefore, consider evaluation to be an integral part of legal 
science. Scientifically speaking, a major advantage of a monodisciplinary approach 
that has been developed and refined over centuries is that a high level of 
harmonization in concepts and methods has been reached. Legal scholars have created 
a shared language to describe legal norms and hermeneutic tools to apply them to 
concrete cases. At the same time, when concepts and methods are more or less 
stabilized, there will be limited room for innovation. Innovation in the description and 
application of legal norms is not even considered to be an ideal to strive for within a 
traditional conception of legal science. Unlike the science of literature, legal science is 
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not interested in producing the most creative or original interpretation of authorative 
texts but in representing them in the most precise and accurate way. On the contrary, 
in order to protect the value of legal security, it is important that the legal system is 
presented as much as possible as a unified and univocal whole. A monodisciplinary 
approach to law, restricting itself to a representation and evaluation of the existing 
body of law on the basis of pre-established concepts and methods, from a scientific 
point of view may not seem very interesting or exciting– despite all its craftsmanship. 
It does not and does not intend to contribute in any significant way to the innovation 
of scientific thought. 
 (ii) More room for innovation is created when a legal scholar turns to another 
discipline in order to get inspiration. In this case, the source discipline is used as a 
heuristic device for generating new insights from which the target domain – the legal 
science – may profit. These new insights will be evaluated according to values and 
truth criteria internal to the science of law. For instance, philosophical theory may 
indicate that interpretation of legal texts is never a matter of sheer subsumption but 
always is a creative process. In order to make this insight acceptable to legal science, 
it has to justified in terms of its internal values, such as reasonableness or fairness. 
However, legal scholars who prioritize legal security over the fore-mentioned values 
will be inclined to reject this insight. Because external input is controlled by and 
mediated through internal standards, the heuristic approach has the same advantage as 
the monodisciplinary approach that it protects the unity of the concepts and methods 
used. An important weakness of the heuristic approach is, exactly because the external 
input has to be justified exclusively in internal terms, that the new insights are 
generated in a non-systematic, accidental and arbitrary way. Anything can be a source 
of inspiration to the science of law, not only other scientific disciplines but also 
novels, movies or long strolls along the sea. From the viewpoint of legal science it 
does not make a difference where the insights are taken from or how they are 
discovered, as long as they can be justified in legal terms; they have no argumentative 
force on their own.  
 (iii) If a legal scholar treats the source discipline not merely as inspiration but 
as a necessary contribution to the science of law, the transfer of insights may acquire a 
more systematic and less arbitrary character. That is only possible if one considers – 
against Kelsen – the task of legal science to be more than just the representation of the 
legal system and an assessment of its internal consistency; it should include also the 
development and improvement of the existing legal system. Otherwise, if legal 
scholars are seen solely as the bookkeepers of the law, there would be no need for 
external input. Suggestions for developing and improving the law may be taken from 
different sources. According to the early Luhmann, sociology constitutes a „necessary 
preparatory science for the science of law” that has to pave the way for juristic 
decisions. However, that raises the question, as discussed above, why one source 
discipline – in this case: sociology – is favoured. Moreover, the problem is how to 
assess the quality of the external input. One has to be trained in two disciplines to be 
able to take a stand in debates that take place within these disciplines. If not, one has 
to rely on authorative sources, but these may be contradictory. A final risk connected 
to the transfer of insights from one domain to the other is that the unity of concepts 
and methods used in the target domain is disturbed. For instance, what will happen 
when Luhmann‟s distinction between functional and non-functional or the economic 
distinction between efficient and inefficient is inserted into the legal discourse?  
 (iv) In multidisciplinary research all these risks are duplicated, because the 
transfer of insights is not one-way, as in the previous approach, but two-way: the 
 12 
disciplines involved are source and target domain at the same time. To be capable of 
doing this, a scholar has to be at home in both disciplines. If so, he does not have to 
rely on authorities but can assess himself the quality of the imported knowledge. The 
transplantation of foreign terminology into a scientific discourse may lead, as the later 
Luhmann (1991, 457) argued, to „understandable misunderstandings”. Moreover, 
problems may arise when disciplines produce contradictory insights. From a 
sociological point of view a legal norm may seems invalid because it is not applied 
anymore, whereas from a legal perspective the act may still be considered valid law 
because it was created on the basis of a higher legal norm. In other words, how to 
secure coherence in knowledge claims in a multidisciplinary approach? At the same 
time, multidisciplinary research offers good opportunities of innovation in the target 
as well as in the source domain, if a fruitful interaction between the two can be 
established.  
 (v) Finally, an integrative approach offers the best opportunity for exchanging 
knowledge. Science is freed from artificial and arbitrary disciplinary boundaries. 
However, by transgressing boundaries, disciplines lose their distinct character and 
may become more and more identical. Moreover, in its effort to see everything from 
all sorts of perspectives at the same time, an integrative approach may end up in 
seeing nothing at all. Paradoxically, the more successful an integration of disciplines 
is, the more it resembles a monodisciplinary approach, with all its advantages and 
disadvantages.  
 Initially, we started from a dichotomy between an interdisciplinary or 
integrative approach to law, inspired by Dewey‟s pragmatist philosophy, and a 
monodisciplinary approach, advocated by Kelsen and other legal positivists. By 
distinguishing different types of legal research in our dynamic model of 
interdisciplinarity, we are in a position to make this opposition less rigid. On the one 
hand, a monodisciplinary approach to law does not by necessity exclude the 
possibility that legal science profits from insights from other disciplines, if only in a 
heuristic way. On the other hand, an interdisciplinary approach that is successful in 
integrating knowledge from different sources (like Luhmann‟s system theory) may at 
some point become a discipline in its own right. With Luhmann, we believe that a 
direct and „full‟ access to reality is impossible. Our knowledge of the world is always 
mediated through some disciplinary perspective or other.
12
 Whether one wants to stick 
to one perspective, that is the still dominant legal perspective as defended by 
positivism, or tries to transcend this perspective by confronting it with other 
(sociological, ethical, historical, economical, rhetorical etc.) perspectives is a matter 
of personal choice – a choice that will depend on a legal scholar‟s convictions on 
fundamental epistemological and ontological issues.  
At the two extremes of our model of interdisciplinarity, there are two pitfalls 
that in our view need to be avoided: at the one end, the rigidity and closedness of a 
strict monodisciplinary approach and, at the other end, too much flexibility and 
openness that may result in an undifferentiated and undifferentiating fusion and 
confusion of perspectives. Between these extremes, meaningful exchanges between 
different disciplines are possible. However, these exchanges will not always be 
peaceful, since different disciplines will use concepts and methods differently, or may 
at first not recognize each other‟s methods, and so on. From these clashes, new 
insights may spring. 
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Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Aufsatz werden die Möglichkeiten und Beschränkungen interdisziplinärer 
Forschung im Bereich der Rechtswissenschaft erörtert. Inwiefern ist die 
Rechtswissenschaft imstande, Konzepten und Ideen aus anderen wissenschaftlichen 
Disziplinen, wie der Soziologie, der Psychologie, der Philosophie, der Ökonomie und 
der Literaturwissenschaft, zu einkorporieren? Diese Frage wird anhand einer 
Konfrontation zwei entgegengestellten Positionen behandelt: die pragmatische 
Position (Dewey und Putnam), die von der Vergleichbarkeit und Vereinigbarkeit von 
Theorien ausgeht, auf der einen Seite, und die positivistische Position (Kelsen und 
Luhmann), die die Grenzen der wechselseitigen Verständigung und Auswechslung 
betont, auf der anderen Seite. Im Anschluss an dieser Diskussion wird ein 
dynamisches Interdisziplinaritätsmodel präsentiert und werden Vor- und Nachteile der 
verschiedenen Typen der interdisziplinären Forschung diskussiert.    
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